Abstract. We propose an alternative to the Shamir (t, n) secret sharing scheme based on the closest vector theorem. We also give a brief introduction to the Shamir method.
Introduction
A secret sharing protocol is a method to distribute a secret among a group of participants by giving a share of the secret to each. The secret can be recovered only if a sufficient number of participants combine their pieces.
Formally we have the following. We have a secret K and a group of n participants. This group is called the access control group. A dealer allocates shares to each participant under given conditions. If a sufficent number of participants combine their shares then the secret can be recovered. If t ≤ n then an (t, n)-threshold scheme is one with n total participants and in which any t participants can combine their shares and recover the secret but not fewer than t. The number t is called the threshold. It is a secure secret sharing scheme if given less than the threshold there is no chance to recover the secret. If a measure is placed on the set of secrets, and on the set of shares, security can be made precise by saying that given less than the threshold all secrets are equally likely but given the threshold there is a unique secret. We refer to [Sh] and [Bl] for more on the security. Secret sharing is an old idea but was formalized mathematically in independent papers in 1979 by Adi Shamir [Sh] and George Blakley [Bl] .
In the 1979 paper Shamir [Sh] proposed a beautiful (t, n) threshold scheme, based on polynomial interpolation, that has many desirable properties. We describe this in the next section. It is now the standard method for solving the (t, n) secret sharing problem although there are modifications for different situations (see [CFZ] ). Blakely in his original paper proposed a geometric solution based on hyperplanes that is less space efficient for computer storage than Shamir's. In Blakely's scheme the distributed shares are larger than the secret, whereas in Shamir's scheme they are the same size. In this short note we propose an alternative to the Shamir scheme that has the same desirable properties but is somewhat simpler to adjust. It is geometric in nature and based on the closest vector theorem so it has some of the geometric content of the Blakely scheme, but with the shares and secret the same size. In format it follows the Shamir scheme. We also consider this note as a nice introduction, in general, to the secret sharing problem.
There are many different motivations for the secret sharing problem. One of the most important is the the problem of maintaining sensitive information. There are two cruical issues here: availability and secrecy. If only one person keeps the entire secret, then there is a risk that the person might lose the secret or the person might not be available when the secret is needed. Hence it is often useful to utilize several people in order to access a secret. On the other hand, the more people who can access the secret, the higher the chance the secret will be leaked. By sharing a secret in a threshold scheme the availability and reliability issues can be addressed. The paper by Chum,Fine and Zhang [CFZ] contains a wealth of information on secret sharing in general and managing an access control group.
The Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
We suppose that we want to develop an (t, n) secret sharing scheme. The beautiful general idea in the Shamir Scheme is the following. Let F be any field and (x 0 , y 0 ), ..., (x n , y n ) be n + 1 points in F 2 with distinct x i . We say that a polynomial P (x) over F interpolates these points if P (x i ) = y i for i = 0, ..., n. The relevant theoretical result that we need is the following (we can see [A] as a reference and for a proof):
Theorem 2.1. Let F be any field and x 0 , x 1 , ..., x n be n + 1 distinct elements of F and y 0 , y 1 , ..., y n any elements of F . Then there exists a unique polynomial of degree ≤ n that interpolates the n + 1 points (x i , y i ), i = 0, 1, ..., n.
Using this theorem the Shamir (t, n) scheme is roughly this. We choose a field F . The secret is K ∈ F and we choose a polynomial P (x) of degree t − 1 with K as its constant term. We randomly choose distinct x 1 , ..., x n with no x i = 0 and distribute to each of the n participants a point (x i , P (x i )),i = 1, ..., n. By the theorem above any t people can determine the interpolating polynomial P (x) and hence recover the secret K. Given less that t people then any K ∈ F can be the constant term of the polynomial. Therefore every secret, given less shares than the threshold, is equally likely. Hence a member of the access control group has no more information than an outsider until the threshold is reached.
It is suggested that the secret be frequently changed or altered and hence the shares must be redistributed (see [CFZ] ).
For an explicit version of the Shamir scheme, Shamir suggests using a finite field Z q where q is a large prime. By working with a finite field he places a finite distribution on the set of secrets and shows that this scheme has perfect secrecy. See the original paper [Sh] or [CFZ] for a more complete discussion of this.
An Alternative Based on the Closest Vector Theorem
In this section we present an (t, n) secret sharing scheme that could provide an alternative to the Shamir Scheme. The scheme we present is also perfect in the sense that any t people out of the size n access control group can recover the secret but given less than t each possible secret is equally likely.
As described above the Shamir scheme depends on the uniqueness of interpolating polynomials. The present scheme depends on the closest vector theorem (see [A] ).
Theorem 3.1. Closest Vector Theorem. Let W be a real inner product space and V a subspace of finite dimension t. Suppose that w ∈ W , with w not in  V , and e 1 , e 2 , . .., e t is an orthonormal basis of V . Then the unique vector w * ∈ V closest to w is given by w * =< w, e 1 > e 1 + < w, e 2 > e 2 + ...+ < w, e t > e t where < , > is the inner product on W .
Notice that given any basis for the subspace V the Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization procedure (see [A] ) can be used to find an orthonormal basis for V . Hence given w ∈ W we can algorithmically always find w * , the unique vector in V closest to w. If a basis for V is not known and we have only have knowledge or information on proper subspace spans in V of dimension less than t we cannot do this procedure and any point in W can be the secret. That is if we do not have complete knowledge of a basis for V we cannot apply the closest vector theorem. Further since given a subspace of dimension less than t there are infinitely many subspaces of dimension t properly containing it, there is a probability of zero of obtaining the subspace V with only partial knowledge.
THE SECRET SHARING SCHEME We are given an inner product space W of dimension greater than n and an access control group of size n. We assume that the dimesnion of W is much greater than n. There is a hidden subspace V of dimension t. The secret is v ∈ V a vector in V .
The dealer gives each of the n members of the access control group, i = 1, ..., n, two vectors v i , w where v i ∈ V , and w is a vector in the big space W with the property that w / ∈ V and v is the vector in V closest to w. The set {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n } has the property that any subset of size t is independent. Hence any subset of size t determines a basis for V .
Suppose t valid users get together. They can determine a basis for V and hence using the Gram-Schmidt procedure (see [A] ) determine an orthonormal basis. Since w is given they can determine v by the closest vector theorem and recover the secret.
Given a subset of size less than t they generate a subspace of V of dimension less than t and hence in W there are infinitely many extensions to subspaces of dimension t so determining V has probability zero.
As suggested by Shamir the secret should be altered periodically. Here very easily we can change the secret v and just send each user a new w.
